Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Dennis L. Mitchell and Janet Robins Mitchell v.
Harrington Trucking, Inc : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott W. Christensen, Jason M. Kerr; Plant, Wallace, Christensen, Kanell; counsel for appellant.
James A. McIntyre; McIntyre, Golden; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Mitchell v. Harrington Trucking, No. 990187 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2063

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

lue "£WeP
IN THE UTAH APPELLATE COURT

In re: The Marriage of:
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL,

No. 990187-CA
Priority No. 15

Appellee,
HARRINGTON TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendant in
Intervention and
Appellant.

Civil No. 984901224
Judge Anne M. Stirba

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT HARRINGTON
TRUCKING'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.
Counsel for Appellant
Harrington Trucking

Counsel for Appellee
Janet Robins

Scott W. Christensen
Jason M. Kerr
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN
& KANELL
,
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
(801) 363-7611

James A. Mclntyre
McINTYRE 8c GOLDEN, L.C.
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
(801) 266-3399

FILED
Utah Court of Aootate

AUG 1 2 1999

'

&

^e "Bo rep

Julia D'Alesandro
Clark of the Court

IN THE UTAH APPELLATE COURT

In re: The Marriage of:
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL,

No. 990187-CA
Priority No. 15

Appellee,
HARRINGTON TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendant in
Intervention and
Appellant.

Civil No. 984901224
Judge Anne M. Stirba

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT HARRINGTON
TRUCKING'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.
Counsel for Appellant
Harrington Trucking

Counsel for Appellee
Janet Robins

Scott W. Christensen
Jason M. Kerr
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN
& KANELL
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
(801) 363-7611

James A. Mclntyre
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
(801) 266-3399

PARTIES ON APPEAL
Janet Robins and Harrington Trucking, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARTIES ON APPEAL

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

v

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

v

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

vi
1

Relevant Facts

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

6
7

POINT I. BECAUSE HARRINGTON TRUCKING FILED
AN APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON APRIL 7, 1998, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED DEFAULT
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF JANET ROBINS
A. Judge Stirba's Minute Entry Order of
September 18, 1998 Does Not Alter the Fact
that an Answer was on File
POINT II. SINCE THERE WAS AN ANSWER ON FILE,
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IMPROPERLY AND THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

ii

7

9

11

POINT III. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THIS COURT
FINDS THAT DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED
APPROPRIATELY, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
CONCLUSION

13
17

ADDENDUM
Minutes Oral Argument, December 16, 1998
Order
On
Petitioner's
Objection
Recommendation, January 29, 1999

to

Transcript of Hearing, December 16, 1998
Transcript of Hearing, September 18, 1998

iii

Commissioner's

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Erickson v. Schenkers Intntl Forwarders, Inc.,
882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994)

15

Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982)

14

Goldberg v. J. Timmons & A s s o c , 896 P.2d 1241
(Utah App. 1995)
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agolla Development Corp.,

8

611 P.2d

369 (Utah 1980)

14, 15

Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1995)
Reese v. Proppe, 3 Ohio App. 3rd 103 (1981)

8
8, 9

Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah App. 1999)

8

Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy,
958 P.2d 228 (Utah 1998)

8

RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24

1

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55

6, 7, 8, 11

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60

7, 11, 12, 13, 14

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant
to Section 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annot., 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issue is presented for review by this Court: 1)
whether the trial court erred when it entered default judgment when
an answer was already on file; 2) did the trial court abuse its
discretion in refusing to set aside a default judgment entered when
the court mistakenly believed that no answer was on file, when, in
fact, there was an answer on file with the trial court.
These issues were preserved for appeal in the trial court.
(See R. 160-169.)
The standard of review for the first issue is a question of
law for which this Court grants the trial court no defference.
(See Klinger v. Knightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990.)

The standard

of review for the second issue is that the Court of Appeals will
reverse the trial court where, as here, there has been a clear
abuse of discretion.

(See Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah

1982.)
v

DETERMINATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

STATUTES,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b) .

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an attempt by Janet Robins to have herself
declared the common law spouse of Dennis L. Mitchell, a deceased
person. Janet Robins wishes to obtain a judicial declaration that
she is the common law spouse of Dennis Mitchell so that, for among
other reasons, she might be considered a "heir" under Utah's
Wrongful Death statute.

Ms. Robins wishes to be declared an heir

so that she might maintain a wrongful death lawsuit against
intervener, Harrington Trucking, Inc.
Pursuant to that goal, Ms. Mitchell in February, 1998 filed a
verified petition for judicial declaration of common law marriage.
In March, 1998, Harrington Trucking moved to intervene in the case
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ms. Robins objected to the intervention. On or about April 7,
1998, Scott W. Christensen, attorney for Harrington Trucking filed
an Answer.

Said Answer

was

signed

and

contained

a valid

certificate of service indicating that it had been mailed to all
relevant parties.
On or about May 15, 1998, Harrington Trucking's motion to
intervene came before Commissioner Thomas Arnett.
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Commissioner

Arnett ruled that Harrington Trucking be allowed to intervene to
challenge the validity of the alleged marriage between Ms. Robins
and Dennis Mitchell.
Ms. Robins appealed the Commissioner's recommendation to Judge
Anne Stirba who upheld Commissioner Arnett's recommendation by
Minute Entry on or about September 18, 1998.
In that order, Judge Stirba instructed the parties to complete
discovery by October 19, 1998 and for Harrington Trucking to file
an Answer by October 22, 1998.

Judge Stirba's order apparently

ignores the fact that an Answer had been filed on April 7, 1998.
On or about October 28, 1998, Ms. Robins filed a certificate
of default judgment. However, the certificate of default judgment
was not signed by Judge Stirba, the judge assigned to the case, but
rather was signed by Judge William Bohling, who presumably is not
familiar with the facts of the case or that an Answer had been
filed on April 7, 1998.
Immediately, Harrington Trucking filed a motion to set aside
the default judgment. In fact, the motion to set aside any default
judgment or declaration or common law marriage entered in the case
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appears on the court's docket and it the record before the default
j udgment.
Commissioner Arnett again heard the motion to set aside the
default judgment and recommended that it be granted.

Ms. Robins

appealed the Commissioner's ruling and Judge Paul Maughn, again not
Judge Stirba who was assigned to handle the case, decided against
allowing the default judgment to be set aside despite the fact that
it was brought to his attention that an Answer had been filed
before default judgment was entered.
A.

Relevant Facts.

1.

This case arises out of a petition for declaration of

common law marriage filed by Ms. Robins.
2.

Ms. Robins asserts that she was the common law spouse of

a person now deceased, Dennis L. Mitchell.
3.

(R. 1-4.)

(R. 2.)

On or about March 24, 1998, Harrington Trucking moved to

intervene as a defendant in this case to challenge the validity of
the

alleged

common

law marriage

Mitchell and Janet Robins.

(R. 38.)

3

relationship

between Dennis

4.

Janet Robins filed an objection to Harrington Trucking's

motion to intervene as a defendant on or about April 1, 1998.

(R.

45.)
5.

On April 7, 1998, Harrington Trucking filed a reply

memorandum in support of its motion to intervene.

(R. 58.)

Harrington Trucking also filed, at that time, a separate objection
or Answer to Ms. Robins7 petition for declaration of common law
marriage.

(R. 55-57.)

6. On or about May 15, 1998, Commissioner Thomas Arnett heard
oral arguments on Harrington Trucking's motion to intervene.

(R.

91.)
7. Commissioner Arnett recommended that Harrington Trucking's
motion to intervene be granted.

(R. 94.)

8. On or about May 26, 1998, Ms. Robins filed an objection to
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation.
9.

(R. 95.)

On September 18, 1998, Judge Anne Stirba heard oral

arguments on Harrington Trucking's motion to intervene.

(R. 105.)

10. Judge Striba's order requires that discovery be completed
by October 19, 1998 and that an Answer be filed by October 22,

4

1998.

It further orders that an evidentiary hearing be held on

November 12, 1998.
11.

(R. 117-118.)

Judge Stirba's order makes no reference to the Answer

already filed by Harrington Trucking on April 7, 1998.

(R. 117-

118.)
12.

On or about October 28, 1998, Ms. Robins filed a default

certificate signed by Judge Bohling.

(R. 132-134.)

13. However, at the time, Judge Stirba was still assigned to
the case. (R. 132.)
14. There is no indication from the record that Judge Bohling
considered the Answer already on file since April 7, 1998 in his
decision to sign the default certificate.
15.

(R. 132-134.)

Also on October 28, 1998, in fact before the default

certificate was entered into the court docket, Harrington Trucking
filed a motion to set aside any default judgment or declaration of
common law marriage entered in this case.
16.

(R. 123.)

On or about December 16, 1998, Commissioner Arnett heard

Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment.
238.)
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(R.

17.

Commissioner Arnett ordered that the default judgment be

set aside.
18.

(R. 241.)
On that same day, Judge Paul Maughn heard Ms. Robins'

objection to Commissioner Arnett's report and recommendation.

(R.

251.)
19.

Commissioner Maughn refused to set aside the default

judgment even though it was brought to his attention that an Answer
had been on file since April 7, 1998.
20.

In fact, at the time Judge Maughn made his ruling, Judge

Stirba was still assigned to this case.
21.

(R. 253.)

(R. 254.)

From Judge Paul Maughn's order denying Harrington

Trucking's motion to

set aside default judgment, Harrington

Trucking now appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Default judgment was entered in this case under Rule 55 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, Rule 55 does not allow

default judgment to be entered unless an Answer is not on file.
Because an Answer had been on file since April 7, 1998, it was
inappropriate for Judge Bohling to enter a default judgment.
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Furthermore, the trial court erred in refusing to set aside
the default judgment even though it was informed that an Answer was
on file.

The trial court abused its discretion under Rules 60(a)

&(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it failed to grant
Harrington

Trucking's

motion

to

set

aside

default

judgment.

Therefore, this Court should rule that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to set aside default judgment when an Answer
was on file and remand this case for a hearing on the merits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BECAUSE
HARRINGTON
TRUCKING
FILED
AN
APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON APRIL 7, 1998, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED DEFAULT JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF JANET ROBINS.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 states, in pertinent part:
(a) Default.
(1) Entry.
When a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has
failed to plead or otherwise defend as
provided by these rules and that fact is made
to appear the clerk shall enter his default.
Therefore, the plain meaning of the terms of Rule 55, default
judgment may not be entered unless and until it is shown that the
opposing party has failed to plead or otherwise defend the claim.
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In this case, on April 7, 1998, Harrington Trucking filed an Answer
or objection to Janet Robins' petition for a declaration of common
law marriage. Therefore, it was improper for the court to enter a
default judgment in the first instance.
As a preliminary matter, the interpretation of Rule 55 is a
question of law.

See Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958

P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1998); Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah
App. 1999); Goldberg v. J. Timmons & Assoc, 896 P.2d 1241, 1242
(Utah App. 1995) (each holding that the interpretation of a Rule of
Civil Procedure is a legal question.)

Because interpretation of

Rule 55 is a legal question, whether default judgment should have
been entered in this case is also a question of law reviewed under
a correctness standard.

See Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1055

(Utah App. 1995).

Therefore, no defference is given to the trial

court's decision.

See Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah App.

1999).
Under the facts of this case, it is clear that the trial court
erred in granting default judgment.

Under the plain language of

Rule 55, a trial court cannot grant a default when an Answer is on
file. See Reese v. Proppe, 3 Ohio App. 3rd 103 (1981) (holding that
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"once a defendant has Answered the plaintiff's complaint and
contested the allegations therein, no default judgment may entered
against that defendant.")
A.
Judge Stirba's Minute Entry Order of
September 18. 1998 Does Not Alter the Fact
that an Answer was on File,
Judge Stirba ordered that an Answer be filed on or before
October 22, 1998. Harrington Trucking complied with that order by
having already on file an Answer since April 7, 1998.
However, Harrington Trucking anticipates that Janet Robins's
counsel will argue that Harrington Trucking violated Judge Stirba's
order by failing to file an additional Answer by October 22, 1998.
However, this potential argument is without merit under the
circumstances of this case.

A transcript of the hearing before

Judge Stirba which was held on September 18, 1998 and out of which
the minute entry arose, is part of the record on this case.

A

review of that transcript indicates that the court was not informed
by either counsel for Ms. Robins or Harrington Trucking that an
Answer had in fact been filed. In fact, there appears to have been
some misunderstanding regarding whether or not an Answer had been
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filed at all.

Counsel for Ms. Robins stated during the hearing

that no Answer had been filed:
We're now nine months down the road from the time
the petition was originally filed. It well and truly is
in default at this point, there's been no pleading filed
in opposition to it and-and that would allow us to get
down the road.
(Emphasis added.)(R.295 pg. 3.) 1
Later, plaintiff's counsel again indicated to the court that
an Answer had not been filed.
I-I-and so, but I mean, Harrington
Trucking may be in a dilemma, but by this
point, they should have been able to do some
investigation and be able to tell us what it
is they contest and thev haven't filed a
single pleading and that's required by the
rule.
(Emphasis added.)(R. 295 pg. 4.)
Finally, the court ordered as follows:

Harrington Trucking in no way wishes to insinuate that
plaintiff's counsel was misrepresenting facts to the trial court.
It appears from the record that there was a genuine
misunderstanding about whether or not an Answer had been filed at
the September 18, 1998 hearing. In fact, Harrington Trucking's
counsel did not correct Janet Robins' counsel's misunderstanding
about the fact that an Answer had been filed. Counsel for
Harrington Trucking who attended the hearing was a substitute
counsel who was unfamiliar with the case and was not aware that an
Answer had been filed.
10

And then-and then there must-at that
point, I would say an Answer to the petition
if one is intended to be filed should be filed
on or before the 22nd of October so you know
exactly what any claims are.
(R. 295 pg. 16.)
This dialogue clearly indicates that counsel for Janet Robins,
Harrington trucking and the Trial Court did not understand that an
Answer had in fact been filed.

However, regardless of what the

trial court and counsel might have believed, the fact remains that
an Answer was, in fact, on file. Therefore, under Rule 55, it was
inappropriate to enter default judgment.
POINT II.
SINCE THERE WAS AN ANSWER ON FILE, DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IMPROPERLY AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in
pert inent part,
(a) Clerical
mistakes.
Clerical mistakes
in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders.
During the
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
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appellate court, and thereafter while the
appeal is pending may be so corrected with
leave of the appellate court.

(b) Mistakes,
inadvertence;
excusable
neglect;
newly discovered
evidence;
fraud,
etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial
under
Rule
59(b);
(3) fraud
(whether
heretofore
denominated
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
misrepresentation
or
other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the j udgment.
There are at least two bases under Rule 60 for setting aside
the default judgment in this case.

First, under Rule 60(a), the

entry of default judgment was made based upon a clerical error,
i.e., that an Answer was not in fact on file.

Rule 60(a)

specifically allows the court, at any time, or the appellate court,
at any time, to correct such errors on their own initiative or by
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motion. In this case, correction of the clerical error of entry of
default judgment is clearly warranted.
Second, the default judgment may also be set aside under Rule
60(b) (1) for reason of mistake. Clearly, there was a mistake made
in this case.

Janet Robins and Harrington Trucking's counsel

should have indicated to the trial court at the September 18, 1998
hearing that an Answer was on file.

The trial court should have

discovered that an Answer was on file.

These mistakes culminated

in the entry of a default judgment where none was warranted. Given
the timeliness of Harrington Trucking's motion, the trial court
should have set aside the default judgment.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
failed to set aside the default judgment entered against Harrington
Trucking.
POINT III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THIS COURT FINDS THAT
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED APPROPRIATELY,
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:

(b) Mistakes,
inadvertence;
excusable
neglect;
newly discovered
evidence;
fraud,
etc.

On motion and upon such terms as are
13

just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; ....
An appellate court reviews a trial court's failure to set
aside a default judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.
See Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982) .

In this case,

there has been a clear abuse of discretion because the trial court
failed to set aside default judgment under Rule 60(b).
The policy of the law is clear.

Default judgments are

extremely disfavored by courts because they rob the litigants' of
a trial on the merits. According to the Utah Supreme Court:
It is not to be questioned that in appropriate
circumstances default judgments are justified;
and where they are, they are invulnerable to
attack. However, they are not favored in the
law, especially where the party has timely
responded with challenging pleadings. When
that has been done some caution should be
observed to see that the party is not taken
advantage of. Speaking generally about such
problems, it is to be kept in mind that access
to the courts for the protection of rights and
the settlement of disputes is one of the most
important factors in the maintenance of a
peaceable and well ordered society.
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The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law
is to accord litigants the opportunity for a
hearing on the merits, where that can be done
without serious injustice to the other party.
To that end the courts are generally indulgent
towards the setting aside of default judgments
where there is a reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendants failure to appear,
and where timely application is made to set it
aside.
Consistent with the objective just
stated, where there is doubt about whether a
default should be set aside, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end
that each party may have an opportunity to
present his side of the controversy and that
there be a resolution in accordance with law
and justice.
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agolla Development Corp.,611 P.2d
369, 371 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
The rules regarding excusable neglect have been elaborated on
by the Utah Supreme Court. According to the Utah Supreme Court:
In order for defendant to be relieved from the
default judgment, he must not only show that
the judgment was entered against for excusable
neglect (or any other reason specified under
Rule 60 (b) ) , but he must also show that his
motion to set aside the judgment was timely,
and that he has a meritorious defense to the
action.
Erickson v. Schenkers Intntl Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah
1994) .
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In this case, there is no dispute that the motion to set aside
the default judgment was timely.

In fact, the motion to set aside

the default judgment appears on the docket before the actual
default certificate.

This fact indicates that the motion to set

aside any default judgment was filed before the signed default
certificate.
Furthermore, there is no question that Harrington Trucking has
a meritorious defense to this action.

Included in the record

attached to Harrington Trucking's reply memorandum in support of
its motion to set aside default judgment or declaration of common
law marriage are subpoenas and other records which indicate that
there is a meritorious defense to this action.

In any event, the

trial court did not base its decision to deny Harrington Trucking's
motion to set aside default judgment on the grounds that Harrington
Trucking did not have a meritorious defense to the action. Rather,
the trial court believed that Harrington Trucking failed to show
excusable neglect.

(R. 255.)

This case involved an extremely tight discovery schedule.
Pursuant to that discovery schedule, Harrington Trucking attempted
with great diligence to conduct a great amount of discovery in a
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very short period of time.
successful in that pursuit.

Harrington Trucking was largely
In fact, Harrington Trucking was so

successful that it found substantial evidence which would suggest
that Ms. Robins' petition for a declaration of common law marriage
is without merit.
Furthermore, the record was clear that valid Answer was on
file which obviated the need to file a second Answer.

Clearly,

under these circumstances, excusable neglect exists because it was
reasonable for Harrington Trucking to believe that it had complied
with all of the requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure when it filed its original Answer in April 1998.
Under these circumstances, the court clearly abused its
discretion in failing to set aside default judgment.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Harrington Trucking
respectfully requests this court to reverse Judge Maughn's decision
to deny Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment,
set aside the default judgment and remand this case for a hearing
on the merits.
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DATED this

day of August, 1998.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN, WALLACE & KANELL

Od

&feU£
SCOTT W.^CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed,
prepaid, this

postage

l^t^-day of August, 1999, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing t o ^ h e

following:

Attorneys for Janet Robins:
James A. Mclntyre, Esq.
McINTYRE Sc GOLDEN
360 East 4500 South #3
Murray, UT 84107
Attorneys for Lindsev Mitchell:
Mark A. Larsen, Esq.
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 South Main Street, 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Attorneys for Arlene Greco:
James R. Boud, Esq.
ASHTON, BROUNBERGER & BOUD
765 East 9000 South, Ste. A-l
Sandy, UT 84 094

Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna:
David E. Sloan, Esq.
Kevin L. Jones, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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ADDENDUM

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS L MITCHELL Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

vs,

Case No: 984901224 CL
Plaintiff

Clerk:

Judge:
Date:

PAUL G MAUGHAN
December 16, 1998

marcyt

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): JANET ROBINS MITCHELL
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES A. MCINTYRE
Attorney for the Intervenor: JASON M KERR
Video
Tape Number:
11:41

HEARING
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for oral argument
on objection to commissioner's recommendation. The Court hears
argument from respective counsel and overrules the commissioner's
recommendation. The default judgment previously entered is
reinstated. Mr. Mclntyre is instructed to prepare an order
consistent with the Court's ruling.

Page 1 (last)

F, L
T "

° ' S ™ C T COURT

Third Judicial District

JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of:
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

I
I
I
|

ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION

1

Civil No. 984901224

'

Honorable Anne M. Stirba

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing on
Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation on December
16, 1998, at the hour of 11:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Paul
G. Maughan.

Petitioner, Janet Robins Mitchell, was present and

represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and for Mclntyre &
Golden, L.C. Intervenor Harrington Trucking's counsel, Jason Kerr,
was also present.

The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on

file, and after hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause
appearing

therefore,

makes

the

following

findings

of

fact,

conclusions of law and order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court's Minutes, Oral Argument, Notice signed and

entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on September 18th, 1998,

required

Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, to file an Answer, if they were
going to, by October 22, 1998, which was 41 days from the date of
the Minutes, Oral Argument, Notice.
2.

Because of the items set forth above as well as the

additional length of time to answer Petitioner's Petition for
Declaration of Common Law Marriage and the shortened discovery
schedule, Harrington Trucking was, if anything, on heightened
awareness of the time critical nature of these proceedings and that
they were to answer because of the specificity of the Minutes, Oral
Argument, Notice. The Motion to Set Aside may have been timely and
there may have been cause, but Harrington's neglect was not
excusable under these circumstances.
3.

The provisions of Rule 60(b) do address the issue of

prejudice.
4.

The jurisdictional nature of the statute which says

common law marriage must be established within one (1) year and
that time is running and because of the schedule of the Court and
the schedule of counsel, this case cannot be tried without undue
hardship and prejudice to Petitioner.
5.

Harrington Trucking may have other means for obtaining

relief.
6.

Because this decision may have an impact, (even if it may

have an adverse effect) is not sufficient grounds to outweigh the

2

^35

actual prejudice that will be sustained by the Petitioner in this
action if the Commissioner's recommendation is sustained.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Commissioner

Thomas

N. Arnett's

recommendation

that

Intervenor Harrington Trucking's default be set aside, should be
reversed.
2.

Intervenor,

Harrington

Trucking's

default

and

Petitioner's Default Judgment & Judicial Declaration of Common Law
Marriage should be reinstated
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
1.

Commissioner

Thomas

N. Arnett's

recommendation

that

Intervenor Harrington Trucking's default be set aside, is reversed.
2.

Intervenor, Harrington Trucking's default is reinstated

along with Petitioner's Default Judgment & Judicial Declaration of
Common Law Marriage.
DATED this

/ /

A
day of

Aj^UJi^

BY THE COURT:

19 ?f .

^C^£^P?S

HONORABLE PAUL
District Court
Approved as to form:
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANEL, P.C.

JASON KERR
Attorneys for Harrington Trucking
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

Good morning, counsel.

I appreciate

3

your willingness to come here on such short time.

4

you appreciate the Court's willingness as well.

5
6

Would you state your appearances for the record,
please.

7
8

MR. MCINTYRE:

Your Honor, James Mclntyre for

Janet Robins Mitchell, the petitioner in this matter.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

I hope

MR. KERR:

Okay.
Jason Kerr, for intervenor Harrington

Trucking.

12

THE COURT:

13

So you?ve had an order today, a recommended— is

14

Thank you, Mr. Kerr.

I it an order or recommendation?

15

MR. MCINTYRE:

The way that this procedure

16 I normally works, your Honor, is that the Commissioner makes a
17

recommendation, there is an objection filed, which—

18

THE COURT:

Right, which puts it before—

19

MR. MCINTYRE:

Which puts it before you, and so
Although, once it!s

20

it's not yet an order of the Court.

21

announced, it becomes an order of the Court during the

22

interim.

23

THE COURT:

Until it's changed, that's right.

24

MR. MCINTYRE:

25

THE COURT:

Right.

So you want t o —

1

time on the 18th and I may have some time on the 28th.

2

the problem is we also have witnesses that we have to get

3

together.

4

But

We've now shifted the burden from Harrington

5

Trucking to set aside the default, we've shifted the burden

6

back to Janet Mitchell on an extremely abbreviated basis.

7

THE COURT:

Let me ask this question.

Why was the

8 J trial— or the hearing set in November, why wasn't that
9

addressed sooner than today?

10

but what's happened between—

11

MR. MCINTYRE:

It was struck on the default,

Not a thing.

Why it was ever

12

scheduled in front of the commissioner instead of the Court,

13

that's a jurisdictional question that I haven't even got

14

into.

15

has jurisdiction over this matter.

16

matters that the— that the rules allow the commissioner to

17

have jurisdiction over.

18

limited to divorces, adoptions, paternity actions, those

19

sorts of things.

20

of the things that commissioners have jurisdiction over.

21

But, quite frankly, I don't know how the commissioner
This is not one of those

The commissioner's jurisdiction is

But declarations of marriage are not one

I don't believe— I don't know this for a fact,

22

I but my belief is a commissioner cannot marry someone unless

23

they happen to be a marriage commissioner authorized by the

24

clerk of the Court.

25

that issue, but it certainly is an issue.

I don't know.

I haven't researched
I thought a

1

claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the party's

2

conduct, the need for finality of judgments and the

3

respective hardships in denying or granting relief."

4

think the hardship in this case in granting the motion to

5

set aside the default judgment is we1re faced with a

6

jurisdictional problem here.

7

loses jurisdiction to determine that there's a valid

8

marriage on the 29th of December.

9

think the case lot is clear, I donft think that there's any

10

I

I believe that this Court

I just don!t think— I

choice in that matter.

11

There is a prejudice to the petitioner if the

12

default judgment is set aside, that is the ultimate

13

prejudice.

14

not done by the 29th.of December.

15

having to prepare in very short order for a trial that we

16

didn't think was going to happen.

17

think there was going to be a trial was because the Court

18

had already entered an order declaring that the marriage was

19

valid.

20

Her marriage can never be declared valid if it's
We are in the dilemma of

The reason we didn't

And, frankly, the time that's available for both

21

the Court's calendar and for my calendar is extremely short.

22

I don't mean t o — maybe this isn't a good reason, but it's a

23

practical reason.

24

represent.

25

I have other clients that I have to

I have to take my time to be prepared for their

I cases and I have their cases already scheduled and have been

i

for a long time.

2

November.

3

Trucking defaulted.

4

This case was scheduled to be tried in

It wasn't tried in November because Harrington

Their default— they are now saying, Well, that's

5

excusable, we have good reasons for making the default.

6

Even assume that that's all true, there is no bad conduct--

7

or there is no conduct on the part of the petitioner that in

8

any way kept them from coming back before Judge Stirba long

9

before the 12th of November.

10

If they wanted to set aside, why didn't they come

11

in and say, Let's have a hearing on whether or not this

12

ought to be set aside so that we can still have our hearing

13

on November 12th.

14

15th of December and. say, Poor me, poor me.

15

the Court accommodate our failure to diligently pursue the

16

remedy we asked for.

17

allowed by the Court to intervene, but we failed to

18

contravene any of the allegations until the 28th, after the

19

default had been entered.

20

That was never done.

They wait until the
I need to have

We asked for intervention.

We've been

So that's the reason that I believe it is

21

absolutely unfair and prejudicial to my client and that's

22

why— and I very much appreciate the Court accommodating us

23

on what is admittedly very short notice.

24
25

THE COURT:

I have one procedural question.

In

the file the intervenor does say, in effect, we1re not sure

1

MR. KERR:

First, just to clarify one issue, the

2

hearing on November 12th, I believe was to be before

3

Judge Stirba.

4

little bit and talk to the Court about what actually

5

happened and led up to this default judgment.

6

I

Okay.

Now, let me-- I'd like to back up a

The motion to intervene was filed way back in

7

April, I believe.

Let me double-check that.

Excuse me.

8

March 24th, 1998.

In April— on April 7th of 1998,

9

Harrington Trucking, as the Court noticed, filed an

10

objection to the petition for declaration of common law

11

marriage.

12

thereof, was what was an answer.

13

April or May or June or July whether or not we could even

14

file an answer.

15

intervention, makes no mention of filing an answer.

16

didn't even know, up until the Court's order in October,

17

that we could even file an answer.

18
19
20

And attached to that, the memorandum in support
Again, we didn't know in

Rule 24, under which we made the
We

What happened was we were under an extremely
abbreviated time schedule.
THE COURT:

Let's stop right there for a minute.

21

You say that you didn't know you could file an answer or you

22

didn't understand the rules or the procedures that were—

23

MR. KERR:

It was unclear because our motion to

24

intervene and our— really wasn't effectively granted, my

25

understanding, until October.

That was my understanding,

1

because the report and recommendation had been objected tc.

2

And it wasn't clear to anyone, I don't think, that we needed

3

to file an answer until October-- until the October order

4

when the judge specifically stated, You need to file a n —

5

you need to file an answer on this date.

6

Okay.

But way back in April we'd sort of foreseen this

7

problem and said, Okay, if something comes up, if additional

8

pleading is necessary, we're going to attach this, this will

9

serve as our answer.

The Court will note that the Answer—

10

the Supplementary Answer we filed on the 28th of October is

11

essentially the same, it's in the form of a general denial.

12

So the argument that they didn't have notice that— what we

13

would be objecting to really is without merit.

14
15

THE COURT:. But the fact is you were ordered to do
an answer, not—

16

MR. KERR:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. KERR:

THE COURT:

25

See, my

The Court's order was to file an

answer.

23
24

Well, I don't know.

understanding—

21
22

You couldn't rely on what you'd

already filed.

19
20

That's correct.

MR. KERR:
too.

Right.

Let me back up a little bit

The attorney who was present on the October hearing—
MR. MCINTYRE:

It's September.

1

MR. KERR:

I'm sorry.

September.

The September

2

hearing was Mr. Williams from our office.

3

is the lead attorney on the case.

4

the pleadings.

5

Exhibit D.

6

don't know what went on there at that hearing so I can't

7

tell you, but all I know is what's in the Court's order.

8
9

Mr. Christensen

Mr. Christensen filed all

I don't know if Mr. Williams was aware of

Okay.

I don't know if he knew at the time. I

On to the issue of the abbreviated time schedule,
we have interviewed several witnesses on our own, we've done

10

some informal discovery.

11

been very kind in trying t o — was very kind in trying to

12

work it out and we did work out most of the discovery

13

issues.

14

objections to what materials would be going to certain

15

parties.

16

reveal certain materials we got directly from the plaintiff

17

to other parties.

18

over the documents.

There was a delay, however, because there was some

And we sent a letter saying that we wouldn't

19
20

Their— plaintiff's counsel has

Once he got that letter, then he turned
But there was some confusion there.

Furthermore, given the tight, tight schedule that
J we were under, it just— it was simply excusable neglect, it

21

was inadvertence, as the rule specifically states. Now,

22

Rule 60(b), as the petitioner's counsel has correctly

23

indicated, states that— there are three requirements under

24

Rule 60(b) for granting a motion to set aside default

25

judgement.

1

Do you mind if I take this?

2

MR. MCINTYRE:

3

MR. KERR:

Oh, no, not at all.

I only made one copy of the Court's—

4

the Report and Recommendation of the commissioner on that.

5

I'd just like to read from that Recommendation, though.

6

states that, "It is the finding of this Court that

7

Harrington Trucking, Inc. has shown all of the requirements

8

for setting aside default judgment under Rule 60(b)."

9

Then it specifically mentions certain things.

10

reading from paragraph A.

11

Trucking has shown that this motion to set aside was

12

timely."

13

It

I'm

"Specifically, Harrington

I actually went down and printed out a copy of the

14

docket from the day,. the 28th, when we filed our motion.

15

think it's interesting to note that on the docket from this

16

Court, 10-28-98 filed Answer to Verified Petition for

17

Judicial Declaration.

18

support a motion to set aside default.

19

certificate is actually entered in after.

20

J timely we were.

I

There was also a memorandum to
The default
So that's how

We got our motion and our Answer in

21

before— I assume— I presume that the dates and the order

22

has some relevance to when they actually received it down at

23

the clerk's office.

24

petitioner got their default certificate filed with the

25

clerk.

We actually got ours in before the

On the same day, that's how timely it was.

1

Second, we've shown that it was because of

2

excusable neglect.

3

it understandable, at the very least, as to why someone

4

would forget to file the answer.

5
6

The abbreviated discovery schedule made

And finally, Harrington Trucking has shown that
I there is a meritorious defense to this lawsuit.

We've

7

interviewed several witnesses, we have several— we've

8

obtained documents for discovery which question the validity

9

of this marriage.

10

Therefore, there is clearly a meritorious

defense here.
I!d like to back up a little bit and talk about

11
12

what happened when we filed our motion to set aside. I

13

personally brought that motion here to the court.

14

personally filed it with the clerk.

15

copies and brought them to Judge Stirba.

16

that time, had already left due to her incapacity.

17

to her clerk.

18

down to Commissioner Arnett.

19

shouldn't this be heard before a Judge?

20

believe this should go down to Commissioner Arnett.

21

the file, I don't have it anymore, you can't give me

22

anything.

23

I

I personally took
Judge Stirba, at
I talked

Her clerk informed me that it was being sent
I said, Why, you know,
She said, No, I

I walked to Commissioner Arnettfs office.

He has

I filed

24

a courtesy copy with Commissioner Arnett of the motion to

25

set aside default.

I looked at his calendar.

Initially,

1

there was a date on December 4th of this year, but that was

2

the first one.

3

However, there was scheduling difficulty and I had to click

4

it back to December 16th.

5

could because I realized that we needed to get this resolved

6

as soon as possible.

7

on my own personal knowledge of what I actually did.

8

So, again, that's after November 12th.

But, again, I did it as soon as I

I was not— and I can say this based
I did

I it as quickly as I could.

9

Now, as to the issue of the November 12th hearing,

10

we were ready and wanted to go forward on November 12th.

11

were prepared to go forward on November 12th.

12

going, we had everything lined up.

13

I'm sorry.

14

set aside default judgement.

15
16

We were

However, the defendant—

The petitioner decided to file this motion to

MR. MCINTYRE:

I don't know—

Wait a minute.

Who filed the

motion to set aside?

17
18

We

MR. KERR:

I'm sorry.

The default judgement.

The

petitioner filed for a default judgment.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. KERR:

That was in October.
That was in October, on the 28th of

21

October.

I — I think that the argument can certainly be

22

made that that is what led to this problem.

23

didn't decide to file the default judgement— or default

24

stipli (sic), they did.

25

realized, I think, that given the short period of time that

We didn f t— we

And given— they should have

1

we had, that we were going to file a motion for excusable

2

neglect.

3

want to go forward with this November 12th hearing on the

4

merits.

And that for whatever reason, they didn't really

I think thatfs important because the Supreme Court

5
6

has stated very clearly that the presumption should be in

7

favor of hearing a case on the merits.

8

read a brief statement from the Supreme Court on this issue.

9

This is in the case o f — this is in the briefs, by the way.

I'd just like to

10

Itfs Interstate Excavating, Inc. vs. Angola Development, 611

11

P 2nd, 369 Utah, 1980.

12

The Supreme Court states, "Where there is doubt

13

about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt

14

should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that

15

each party may have an opportunity to present his side of

16

the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance

17

I with law and justice."

18

J

19
20

We are willing to go forward anytime the Court
wants to between now and the 29th, if that!s an issue.

I We've also stated that this one-year time limitation— and

21

I'll state it here again— I don't know if it's

22

jurisdictional or if it's in the matter of the statute of

23

limitations, which can be waived.

24

as an affirmative defense if we decide to have the hearing

25

in January, for example.

We will not bring it up

I've checked with that, with our

1

client, and they're fine with that.

2

forward at any time on the merits of this action, because we

3

believe that the merits will clearly show that Ms. Robins

4

was not the common law spouse of Mr. Mitchell.

5

THE COURT:

We are willing to go

Tell me, why does this proceeding

6

matter to your client, as opposed to challenging this in

7

another action.

8
9

MR. KERR:

We can!t challenge it in another

action.

10

THE COURT:

Well, you canft challenge her

But whether she!s married or not, isn't that

11

marriage.

12

between her and her family?

13

MR. KERR:

Well, we weren't going to until some

14

certain information came to light.

15

heirs came to us.

16

filed, a wrongful death action, by certain heirs of

17

Mr. Mitchell.

18

that Mr. Mitchell was never married to Ms. Robins.

19

Okay.

Some of the other

By the way, there!s already an action

Certain of those heirs came to us and stated

THE COURT:

Even so, isn't that the prerogative of

20

the heirs to come to this action instead of you come on

21

behalf of them?

22
23
24
25

MR. KERR:

I donft why they didn't.

But also,

this really is a matter o f — on the motion to intervene.
THE COURT:

And it's been granted.

asking what this is based on.

I'm just

1

MR. KERR:

Oh, why are we doing it?

We don't

2

believe Ms. Mitchell— or Ms. Robins is an heir.

3

isn't an heir, she's not entitled to recovery under the

4

wrongful death statute.

5
6

THE COURT:

MR. KERR:
I it.

THE COURT:

She's not a party to the wrongful

death petition.

11
12

This is the only day that we can bring

That issue can only be brought in this proceeding.

9
10

But I'm saying, isn't that

really a matter for another date?

7
8

Yes.

And if she

MR. KERR:

That's right.

That's why we had to

bring a motion to intervene, which was previously granted.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. KERR: • And I think that was the issue that was

15

decided.

Okay.

Really, we're only here to decide whether or not

16 J default should be entered.
17
18

THE COURT:

MR. KERR:

20

THE COURT:

How long do you propose this would

MR. MCINTYRE:

Your Honor, I guess the problem

that I have is that I hadn't anticipated this, but—

24
25

Anytime that the Court wishes to do so.

take in terms of time?

22
23

So you're prepared to try

J this anytime between now and the 28th?

19

21

All right.

THE COURT:
how long—

I know.

But if we were to hear this,

1

MR. MCINTYRE:

I think it was previously set by

2

Judge Stirba for a full day, and so I would think it would

3

take a full day.

4

MR. KERR:

I believe that's —

5

MR. MCINTYRE:

6

time, that was mine at the time.

7

responses to their point.
THE COURT:

9

MR. MCINTYRE:

I know.

My estimation would be

about a day.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KERR:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. KERR:

15

I mean, I have some

Ifm not ruling, Ifm just asking.

8

10

That was her estimation at the

questions.

Do you agree, Mr. Kerr?
I believe that is accurate, yes.
Are you through or did you—
Yes, unless you have any more

Thank you.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Mclntyre, do you have a response?

17

MR. Mclntyre:

18

First of all, the disadvantage.

I do, your Honor.
I mean, the

19

disadvantage is having to try the case on short notice.

20

I Now, they're saying, Well, that was the reason that our

21

neglect is excusable was because we had a very short

22

discovery schedule, but at least they knew about it. And

23

they had not just the month of the October.

24

hearing was held on September 18th.

25

I mean, the

Judge Stirba entered an order on September 18th

1

I that said, If you want to file an answer, do it within-- and

2

I believe it was 40 days.

Not the normal 20 that you get to

3

answer a complaint, they had more than enough time to file

4

an answer.

5

filed a motion, and we filed our motion and sent them a copy

6

of it way before the time they filed their motion to set

7

aside the judgment.

They didn!t do it.

I suspect that if we hadn't

8

Now, in terms of heirs who have come to them and

9

said they objected because Mrs. Mitchell wasn't married to

10

Mr. Mitchell, every heir that I know o f — and I represent

11

the estate— every heir that I know of signed an affidavit

12

in support of the petition.

13

I aware of that.

14

So if they've recanted, I'm not

But I just don't know that there is anybody

else.

15

And at this point, as I say, the prejudice is in

16

the preparation time and I don't know how we resolve that.

17

And somebody is going to be prejudiced here.

18

to whether or not Harrington Trucking is really prejudiced,

19

J what their claim is is that they will have a more difficult

20

burden if they chose in the wrongful death case to oppose

21

the claim made by Mrs. Mitchell as an heir.

22

is the personal representative for the estate, she is the

23

heir under Mr. Mitchell's will.

24

declaration.

25

I

With respect

Mrs. Mitchell

She is his wife under this

Now, if they want to claim that this declaration

1

of common law marriage was not made after a trial on the

2

merit, they're entitled to make that argument.

3

of the prejudice to either party, the greater prejudice is

4

to Mrs. Mitchell by setting aside the default, as opposed to

5

the prejudice that's visited upon Harrington Trucking.

So I don't--

6

And let's not lose sight of the fact that it's

7

Harrington Trucking that killed Mrs. Mitchell's husband.

8

She was in the vehicle to see Dennis Mitchell die. And

9

they're the ones who are coming into Court saying, Gee, this

10

Court shouldn't declare the marriage valid.

And if we don't

11

have the hearing before the 29th, the Court may lose the

12

power to do it.

13

not.

14

courts have ruled that the jurisdictional requirements of

15

the statute may not be waived.

I don't know whether it can be waived or

My frank opinion is that our courts— our appellate

16

And I just feel very uncomfortable being put in a

17

position where I have to try a case on such extremely short

18

notice, without time to prepare, or I have to sacrifice the

19

interests of other clients.

20

in a two-man law office.

21

come in and help me out to a great deal because my partner

22

is as busy as I am.

23

mean, contested divorce matters in front of Judge Iwasaki

24

next week.

25

as this hearing was over, I planned to use that as part of

I'm put into a position— I'm

I don't have somebody that can

I've got trials that are scheduled— I

I had planned to use today or even right as soon

1

my prep time because Ifve got other transcripts.
So I!m in a real disadvantage and it's a real

2

Not only that, Ifve gone from a position-- or

3

disadvantage.

4

my client has gone from a position where she has a judicial

5

declaration that her marriage was valid, to a position where

6

she has the burden of proof, if this judgment is set aside.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. KERR:

9

Okay.
Your Honor, could I make two quick

points?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. KERR:

Briefly.
First, the discovery cutoff for this

12

matter was actually on November 19th, which was before the

13

date the petitioner filed the default judgment.

14

preparation should have, for the large part, been completed.

15

So all the

Second, they stated that we can always oppose the

16

finding of this Court in a later proceeding.

17

not true.

18

is the proper forum to make a final determination of the

19

status of Ms. Robins1 relationship with Mr. Mitchell.

20

That's really

We'll be barred by a collateral estoppel.

MR. MCINTYRE:

This

Your Honor, that's just not true.

21

The discovery cutoff was October 19th. We mailed on October

22

27th the default.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

The Court is ready to order, if

24

you're ready to hear.

And it's the— I'd like you to know,

25

I don't know if this is going to matter on any of the order,

1

but, again, that we did go through the file.

2

file and I know what!s in it and I know the history.

3

appreciate your background.

4

I read the
I

But the order of the Court will be to reverse the

5

recommendation of finding of the commissioner for the

6

following reasons and reinstate the default judgment against

7

the intervenor— and tell me the trucking company.

8

sorry.

9

MR. KERR:

10

THE COURT:

Ifm

Harrington Trucking.
—

Harrington Trucking, for the

11

following reasons.

The Court's order previously ordered

12

Harrington Trucking to file an answer if they were going to

13

answer, b y — and help me with the dates.

14

MR. KERR:

15

THE COURT:

October—

October 22nd, I believe.
October 22nd, which was 41 days from

16

the time of the entry of the order.

The order did— also

17

set an abbreviated discovery schedule.

18

because of both of those items, the additional length of

19

time granted to answer and the shortened discovery schedule

20

should have— did not give Harrington Trucking excusable

21

neglect.

22

notice, on a heightened notice, that they were to answer

23

because of the specificity of the order.

24

timely and there may be cause, but it was not based on

25

excusable neglect.

And based on that,

If anything, it should have put them on more

It may have been

1

Also, the provisions of Rule 6C (b) do address the

2

issue of prejudice.

3

nature of the statute, which says that this common law

4

marriage must be established within one year, that time is

5

running.

6

schedule of the counsel, that cannot be compiled with

7

without undue hardship and prejudice to the petitioner at

8

this point, and because other avenues exist.

9

may have an impact, is what Harrington Trucking stated in

10

its petition— its objection to its petition and into its

11

answer.

12

grounds to outweigh the prejudice, the actual prejudice that

13

will be sustained by the petitioner in this action

14

Do you need anything further?

15

MR. MCINTYRE:

16

MR. KERR:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. KERR:

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I

And because of the jurisdictional

And because of the schedule of the Court and the

Because this

It may have an adverse effect is not sufficient

No.

Thank you, your Honor

Thank you, your Honor.
Will you prepare the order?
I will, your Honor.
oooOooo

Thank you

C E R T I F I C A T E
2
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF UTAH

ss
I, JANET LOVELESS, do herby certify that the

5
6

foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 30, contain a true and

7

accurate transcript of the electronically recorded

8

proceedings and was transcribed by me to the best of my

9

ability from the tape furnished to me.

10
11

DATED:

March 15th, 1999

12
13
14
J a r i e t L o v e l e s s , RPR, CSR

15
16

My Commission E x p i r e s :
m m + *k m m m

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

• A

JANET LOVELESS
Notary Public
State of Utah
My Comm. Expires Jan 2, 2002
475 N 750 East Lindon UT 84042 f

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judical uistrici
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY

l

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

MAY 1 9 1999
-ALTI Lfciscouwr*
LMscCOUNTY
wAL
i * I

3
4
5
6

Case No. 984901224

IN THE MARRIAGE OF

ORAL ARGUMENT ON
OBJECTION TO
COMMISSIONERS
RECOMMENDATION

DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL

7

-oOo-

8
9

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of

10

September, 1998, the above-entitled matter came on for

11

hearing before the HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA, sitting as

12

Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of this

13

cause, and that the following videotape proceedings were

14

had.

15

-oOo-

16

A P P E A R A N C E S

17

For the Plaintiff:

JAMES A. McINTYRE
Attorney at Law
Mclntyre & Golden
360 East 4500 South, #3
Murray, Utah
84107

For Harrington Trucking:

MARK J. WILLIAMS
Attorney at Law
Hanson, Epperson & Wallace
4 Triad Center, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah
84180

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

1

I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

MR. WILLIAMS:

—for Harrington

Trucking, your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

Thank you.

The matter

6

comes before the Court pursuant to petitioner's objection

7

to the commissioner's recommendation.

8

the objection, I read the—the original motion and

^

memorandum in—in opposition and the commissioner's

I'm familiar with

10

recommendation and the objections and the response to the

11

objection, so I feel pretty well informed.

12

familiar with the White vs. Blair case.

13

With that, Mr. Mclntyre, you may proceed.

14
15
16
17

18

And I'm also

MR. McINTYRE:
I

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, I suppose t h e — I — I have to
characterize this as somewhat unusual in terms of the

I procedure that this comes to the Court.
I think first and foremost, my understanding

19

has always been that when one filed a motion, one needed

20

to file a memorandum, so we were in the position, the

21

rather unusual position, because Mr. Christensen didn't

22

file a memorandum, we had to file a memorandum without

23

I having anything to respond to.

So, we had to kind of

24

guess and in guessing at—at what the reasons were, one

25

of the things that we were and continue to be in a

1

dilemma about is, What's he claiming?

2

or what's the defense to the action that Mr. Christensen

3

claims o r — o r excuse me, Harrington Trucking claims.

4

-it just doesn't appear anywhere in his motion or in his

5

memorandum or anything else.

6
7

What's the claim

He—his motion just simply says, we ought to be
I allowed to do discovery to find out whether or not we
believe the petition is well taken or not.

9
1

Well, I—they

I should have some basis if the believe it's not well taken

^ I at this point.

11

It-

We're now nine months down the road from

' the time the petition was originally filed.

It well and

12

truly is in default at this point, there's been no

13

pleading filed in opposition to it and—and that would

14

allow us to get down the road.

15

We've filed affidavits from every heir, every

16

potential heir that we can think of, indicating that

17

these parties were considered to be married.

18

I

19

THE COURT:

Well, let m e — l e t me go

back and make sure we're on the same page procedurally.

20

MR. McINTYRE:

21

I

22

I are not the merits of the petition.

THE COURT:

Okay.

What is before the Court
The—what's before

the Court is the objection to the commissioner's
24
2

I recommendation on the motion to intervene.

5 I

MR. McINTYRE:

Correct.

But Rule C —

1

Rule 24(C) requires that there be some pleading that's

p I

.

.

.

filed with the Court that indicates either a claim or a
3

defense or a denial of an averment or something and
there's nothing,

^ I

So that's—in—in that context, we filed our

objection.

And your Honor, it seems to me that in every

7

litigation, there has to be standing, and the Court has

3

I ruled that standing to contest a marriage is between the

9

parties.

10

THE COURT: Well, except the Court

11

has recognized that there is standing insofar as other—a
12

I third party in the White vs. Blair case, that doesn't

13

I seem to be in question.

14

'

15

I problem—and—and—and White vs. Blair is a case where

MR. McINTYRE:

Yeah.

The—the

without allowing a common law wife to intervene, Judge
17

I Rokich dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals

18

I reversed it.

19

I

20
21
22
23

So, it—it's a different kind of a context.

I—the problem that we have is we still don't—
I mean, I—I still have to go back to the same thing and
I don't mean to be repetitive, but that's where I have to
be.

What is it about this petition that is not

appropriate in the mind of Harrington Trucking?
24

25

Now,

they—they ought to have something that they can allege.
I mean, the parties were capable of

' contracting, I mean, what part of this marriage is
2

impossible and it really does seem—I mean, as a matter

3

of policy, it's just horrible to allow someone who has

4

killed your husband to come in and contest your marriage,

5

I mean, that's just repugnant,

6

And you know, I—I understand the dilemma that-

7

-that—that Harrington Trucking finds itself in, but

8

nonetheless, if none of the people who are interested,

9

I have a real interest in this marriage have come forward,

10

why should Harrington Trucking as a third party be

11

allowed to intervene and come forward?

12

White vs. Blair isn't an intervention case.

13

It's—it's an intervention case—

14

|

THE COURT:

15

I

MR. McINTYRE;

16

I sense.

17

I trying to intervene in the determination of the marriage,

Well—
—only in the opposite

It's not that—that the insurance carrier is

18

it's the common law spouse intervening in the accident

19

case.

Now, that's not the situation that we find here.

20

THE COURT:

21

party in the matter of the marriage of Mitchell and

22
23

Well, there is no adverse

I Mitchell unless there's an intervention.
MR. McINTYRE:

True.

Well, there—

24

that's true, unless the estate contests it, which is not

25

the case in this case.

1
2

THE COURT:
I

Okay.

MR. McINTYRE:

But the estate would

normally b e —
4

I

THE COURT:

5

But—

MR. McINTYRE:

—the party who would

6

contest, if there was a reason and it—and frankly, as

7

far as the estate is concerned, that—that was determined

8

and the estate file reflects that Ms. Robins was married

9

I to Mr. Mitchell and was the wife and that's what all the

10

heirs said in that case, too.

11

So, I—I agree, it is a difficult sort of a

12

| situation for the Court in the sense that Ms. Mitchell—

18

I Mrs. Mitchell is also the personal representative for the

14

I Estate of Dennis Mitchell and is not likely to contest

15

I her own marriage.
That being said, I don't know that that gives

17

| Harrington Trucking the right to come in, because they

18

I killed him and may be liable for doing so, and come in

19

I and contest the validity of the marriage.

20 |
THE COURT: What if the—in the
21 action, an action against then the driver or the company
22 of the truck, in that setting, which is more like White
23
24 I

MR. McINTYRE:

25

THE COURT:

It is.

—then the company moves

to dismiss based on there being no common law marriage.
2

In that case, that would be square with White vs. Blair.

3

wouldn't it?

4

MR. McINTYRE:

5

THE COURT:

That would be.

All right.

And so

6

they're entitled to litigate the issue under White vs.

7

Blair..

8

MR. McINTYRE:

9

I if this Court hasn't made a determination based on this

Well, they—they are,

10

action.

11

they're not going to be allowed to in—if my client

12

intervenes, and she fully intends to.

I think if this Court's made a determination,

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. McINTYRE:

Uh huh.
So, I mean, I

1

understand the dilemma that they find themselves in.

16

It's—

^

17

THE COURT:

So it's really a race to

18

the courthouse, who files—who can get a determination

19

first?

In other words, i f — i f —

20

MR. McINTYRE:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. McINTYRE:

23
2

4

25

Well,—

Doesn't that raise then—
—assuming that

there—
THE COURT:

Doesn't that raise the

procedural issue of, well, let's get a determination on

the common law marriage first and then, armed with that,
then intervene or—or file a lawsuit against—
3
4

MR- McINTYRE:
I

THE COURT:

Why can't—

—whoever it is they

sued?
6
7

MR. McINTYRE:

I mean, assuming that

I there's no fraud in my client's application and I mean,
the reason I'm resisting this is not for a lack of

® I confidence in the merits of the case.

I mean, they filed

1

^ I tax returns in 1987, so I mean it's—I mean jointly; so I
' mean it's not like we've got that kind of a concern.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. McINTYRE:

Uh huh.
But if there is fraud,

14

I it seems to me at that point, then they can point out

15

I there's fraud in the—in the gaining of the order

16

' determining that there was a valid marriage; but we start

17

J with the presumption that there's a valid marriage.

18

That's basically the difference.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. McINTYRE:

21
22

Now~
So, I guess I—when I

say they're stuck with the decision this Court makes—
I

THE COURT:

Well, there's no marriage

23

unless it's determined that there is one.

24

has to b e —

25

MR. McINTYRE:

8

There—there

That's t r u e .

1

THE COURT:

2

— a n adjudication for

there to be a marriage.

3

MR. McINTYRE:

4

THE COURT:

5

Okay.

All right.

Do you

have anything else?

6
7

That's true.

MR. McINTYRE:

Other than what's in

I our—I think we've adequately—adequately briefed it with
those additions.

9

|

THE COURT:

10

' Mr. Mclntyre.

11

I

12

I

13

All right.

Thank you,

Mr. Williams?
MR. WILLIAMS:

Thank you, your Honor.

I'll just make a few points.

I believe that

14

your Honor has pointed out the problem with this, the

15

fact that it seems to be a race to the courthouse.

16

If in fact there is a determination by the

17

I Court that in fact there was a common law marriage, that

18

I has been determined for purposes of the case and it seems

19

' to me that Harrington Trucking wouldn't have the ability

20
21

at that point to—to raise it as a defense.
We merely want the opportunity to explore,

22

through discovery, whether or not there are valid grounds

23

for the claim in the petition of common law marriage.

24

This is our opportunity, it seems to us, where the

25

petition has been filed by the plaintiff in this case and

1

clearly, under Chatterton vs. Walker. Rule 24 says that

2

instead of requiring applicants to show that they will be

3

bound by a judgment in the action, the rule now requires

4

applicants to demonstrate only that the depo—that the

5

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter,

6

impair or impede their ability to protect their

7

interests.

8
9

Clearly, our interests in this case would—
I would be affected if in fact there is a determination of

10

common law marriage, where that creates a right of action

11

I in Mrs. Mitchell and that—that allows her to make a

12

I claim under the wrongful death statute.

18

I affects our ability and we merely want to have the right

That clearly

14

to—to do discovery and that's our purpose for

15

intervention.

16

THE COURT:

17

I

18

I

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Mclntyre?
MR. McINTYRE:

Well, your Honor, I

guess the problem with that whole thing is, Mrs. Mitchell
20

I has to intervene in the wrongful death action within one

21 I year for the date of death, or she's out statutorily.
22

I she's not the wife, she can't do that.

23

I

THE COURT:

If

And she has to—under

24

these circumstances, there has to be an adjudication of a

25

common law marriage within one year also.

10

1

I

MR. McINTYRE:

' true.

I mean, I —

3
4

I—I believe that's

THE COURT:
I

I recall the statute—

MR. McINTYRE:

Right.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. McINTYRE:

7

mean, Harrington Trucking may be in a dilemma, but by

8

this point, they should have been able to do some

—saying that.
I~I~and so, but I

^ I investigation and be able to tell us what it is they
10

contest and they haven't filed a single pleading and

11

that's required by the rule.

12

I

13

' contesting here, we're not going to get it done by

And without that, we don't know what they're

14 I December.

This Court's not going to have the opportunity

15

I to make an adjudication if it's contested before the

16

' statute of limitations runs and we're stuck.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. McINTYRE:

19
20

want.

You're—
And that's what they

I mean—
THE COURT:

You're right about that.

21

You're absolutely right about that.

22

be a — a determination prior to the expiration of one year

23
24
25

And there needs to

I or then there's the possibility of—of a (inaudible)
MR. McINTYRE:

Correct.

And I don't

know that—that there would be—I mean, I—I think that

11

1

this Court could make an adjudication that based on the

^

facts before it, there's a common law marriage and allow

3

them the opportunity to contest that if they choose to do

4

so in the other suit.

5

I don't know whether that works or not, but

6

that would seem to me to be the thing that ought to be

7

done in this case—

8
9

THE COURT:
I

Right.

MR. McINTYRE:

—because we're just

10

sitting here fighting about what—I mean, we don't—we

11

just want to get this declaration so we can intervene in

12

I the suit.

13

i

14

J

15

I to which I've referred and the argu—and based on the

16

I arguments of counsel, I'll say first, when I was reading,

17

I and this was a new issue to me in terms of an

THE COURT:

Okay.

I understand.

Having read the various pleadings and the case

18

intervention in a petition to adjudicate a common law

19

marriage.

20

And based on the allegations that the insured

21

in this case—and—and these are merely allegations in

22

this context, drove a truck that killed the—Dennis

23

Mitchell, I was very, very troubled by the notion of

24

having an—the insurer be able to come in and adjudicate

25

or—or contest whether there was a common law marriage.

12

I It—it, you know, at first blush, it strikes you as
p.

* ' unseemly and inappropriate,
3

However, there is the—for example, the White

4

vs. Blair case in which, in that case, the plaintiff and

^

appellant in that case, was someone who was claiming to

6

have had a common law marriage with, I believe it was a

7

deceased and—and in that case then, the defendants moved

8

9 I to dismiss him on the ground that there was no common law
marriage.

10

And the Supreme Court reversed the trial court

11

in that case and then in the context of the holding
^2

discussed the public, the strong public policy against

13
14 I their having sham common law marriages for the purpose of
15 obtaining insurance benefits. And I certainly have no

idea in this case of—of the quality of the evidence as

16

to the common law marriage and I'm certainly not
17

I articulating any opinion about that.

18

I

The—so we have an unusual situation in which

19
20 ' there—there are two ways, evidently, to adjudicate a
21 common law marriage, or at least raise the issue and one

22

is in defense and one is in the petition.

And the—as I

23

recall, the common law marriage provisions of the
statute, there must be an adjudication when one—if

24

25

I there—a common law marriage can be determined either
before the end of the common law marriage or within one
13

year after the end of the common law marriage and the end
being for any reason, separation or divor—or—or—or
death.
And so there is—it's clearly incumbent upon
someone claiming a common law marriage to—to file a
petition and get an adjudication as quickly as possible
after someone is—has died.
By the same token, I don't think that that
procedure should—can be used to undermine what has been
recognized in White vs. Blair as an appropriate defense
by a third party that—as to whether there was a common
law marriage or not.

And for that reason, I think that

the commissioner was correct in his ruling, that the—
that the objection should be sustained and I hereby
sustain—or excuse me, overrule the objection to the
commissioner's recommendation.
Also, in reviewing Rule 24, I think, especially
under the circumstances where a third party wouldn't have
ready knowledge about—without doing some discovery,
wouldn't have information about whether there was an
adjudication or whether there was a common law marriage
and so some discovery is required.

So, I think under

Rule 24, there is sufficient basis that has been alleged
under the circumstances for intervention.
Now, that—there remains the problem, of

14

course, about the timing.

And when was this petition

filed, Mr. Mclntyre?
MR. McINTYRE:
filed in February.

The death occurred—the wrongful
.

CI

.

.

I death statute will expire first.
6

'

7

Well, the petition was

THE COURT:

She has to b e —

When—when will that

expire?

8

MR. McINTYRE:

That will expire in

9
10 | December of this year, the 28th.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not dealing
11

with the wrongful death statute, but I—but that will

12

expire when?

13

I mean, when—
MR. McINTYRE:

14

Well, he—he died on

the 28th, that would also be the date for this Court,
1

° J actually, in terms of determining the validity of the

1

^ ' marriage.

17

18

|

THE COURT:

MR. McINTYRE:

19

THE COURT:

20
21
22
23
24
25

What—

right.

December 28th, 1 9 —

December 28th.

All

So there's going to be a very shortened discovery

period for the purpose of this petition.

And need to be

a hearing date set for there to be a determination
following the—following the discovery period.
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that 30
days is sufficient for discovery as to the issue of

15

I common law marriage.
2

You'll have to just make this a

high priority.
1

And then—and then there must—at that point, I

4

would say an answer to the petition if one is intended to

5

I be filed should be filed on or before the 22nd of October

6

so you know exactly what any claims are.

7

And then a hearing needs to be set, and I think

8

it should be set in November.

9

THE CLERK:

November 12th.

10

THE COURT:

November 12th at what

12

THE CLERK:

8:30.

13

THE COURT:

8:30.

14

THE CLERK:

Is 30 minutes—

THE COURT:

May not be, may need to

THE CLERK:

So you want an

11

| time?

15

16

be evidentiary.

17

I

18

I evidentiary hearing, not argument?

19

I

20
21
22
23

THE COURT:

Right.

And then,

depending on what happens, but we'll set aside the day.
THE CLERK:

Well, let me find a

different day then, that was for argument.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I want Mr.

24

Williams to prepare an order, let's see, an order just—

25

Marcy, we'll just send out a minute entry.

16

1

I

THE CLERK:

Okay.

o

*• '
°

THE COURT:

Overrule the—overruling

the objection and I'll sign it.

That will constitute the

order insofar as the commissioner's recommendation is
°

concerned, and also we'll just include in that, these
discovery cut-off dates.

7

8
9
10

I

THE CLERK:

Okay.

I

THE COURT:
THE CLERK:

So what day?
We can still do it on the

THE COURT:

12th at 9:30, we set

I 12th at 9:30.

11
12

aside the day for an evidentiary hearing.

13

present what evidence there is in connection with this

You'll need to

14

I common law marriage at that time and divide up your time

15

I evenly.

16

'

17

( put in the dates of—that you've just mentioned?

All right?
MR. WILLIAMS:

18

THE COURT:

19

it after all.

No, you don't have to do

I'm going to issue a minute entry order.

20

MR. WILLIAMS:

21

overruling of the objection and—

22
23
24
2

5

I

So you do want me to

THE COURT:

Merely—merely the

Right.

And the schedule.

Okay?
Will that accommodate your concerns about
timeliness?

17

1

'

2

MR. McINTYRE:
THE COURT:

That will, your Honor.

Okay.

Very well.

Don't

^

ask for a continuance on this, you need to get done what

4

you need to do in that time frame.

5
6

All right.
I

Thank you.

MR. McINTYRE:
THE COURT:

8 I

Court's in r e c e s s .

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

9
10

T h a n k you, your H o n o r .

* * *

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

18

1

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

2

STATE OF UTAH

)
,
: ss.
3
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
)
4
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
5

I

13

'

14

| May, 1999.

That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
6 Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the
7
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages,
8
numbered from 1 to 18, inclusive, to the best of my
ability constitute a full, true and correct
9
I transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
10
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
11 attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
12 party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day of

15
16
17
18

Transcriber

19
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day

20

of May, 1999.

21
22
23
24 I

^^"'-"^-^----^

25

( S E A L )

I

Notary

19

Public

1

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2

STATE OF UTAH

)

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:
)

4

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,

5

Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape

6

Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of

7

Utah, do certify that I received an electronically

8

recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the

9

same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the

10

foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 18, inclusive, to the

11

best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct

12

transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape

13

Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.

14

I do further certify that I am not counsel,

15

attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or

16

stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either

17

party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.

18

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of

19
20
21
22

May, 1999.
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